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OF WEEVILS AND WITCHES: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM 
THE GHOST OF RESPONSIBILITY PAST? 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan* 
 
ICOLA Lacey presents a subtle and searching inquiry into the rela-
tionship between history and legal theory.1 The final portion of her 
article, with which I shall engage, criticizes the scholarship on criminal 
responsibility for being too concerned with “its conceptual contours and 
moral foundations,” “rather than with what it is for[:] its social roles, 
meaning, and functions.”2 Lacey then states, “I will argue that we cannot 
understand what responsibility is, or has been, unless we also ask what it 
has been ‘for’ at different times and in different places.”3 
Lacey offers an account of criminal responsibility in the context of 
the institutions that existed, the ideas the people had, and the interests 
that the criminal law was to serve.4 This article is part of her more gen-
eral research agenda that can be thought to contain the following claims: 
Criminal responsibility is a concept grounded in the practice of law. It is 
a social, institutional, functional practice, and the outcome of this prac-
tice—the usage of the label of “responsibility”—is the appropriate ob-
ject of inquiry. Moreover, because this object of study is grounded in a 
practice, and that practice has changed over time, our understanding of 
criminal law’s concept of responsibility has shifted over time. It simply 
makes no sense to Lacey to think about fine-grained accounts of mental 
states as fixed constants as if that idea was instantiated in the practice of 
criminal law before people even thought about culpability that way or 
before they had the institutional mechanisms to realize such ideas.5 To 
 
* Caddell and Chapman Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank 
Charles Barzun for helpful comments and discussion. 
1 Nicola Lacey, Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law, 101 Va. L. 
Rev. 919 (2015). 
2 Id. at 937. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 920. 
5 Id.; see also, e.g., Nicola Lacey, The Jurisprudence Annual Lecture 2013—
Institutionalising Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence, 4 Jurisprudence 1, 6 (2013) 
(“The liberal, democratic and humanist sentiments that necessitate an appeal to individual 
responsibility to legitimise criminal law were unevenly spread in England at the start of the 
eighteenth century . . . .”); Nicola Lacey, Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The 
Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility, 4 Crim. L. & Phil. 109, 118 (2010) [hereinafter 
N 
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her, responsibility is not a “constant through time and space,” as such an 
approach is “in some deep sense . . . antithetical to the very enterprise of 
historical scholarship.”6 
Here is what she is arguing against. There are theorists, myself in-
cluded, who think of questions of responsibility in philosophical terms. 
These moral truths are not socially or historically contingent; they are 
constant questions to which we seek answers. My work abstracts away 
from the fact that most cases are resolved by plea bargain (very much 
part of the practice of criminal law) and certainly from the mechanisms 
by which insanity could be assessed in the 1800s (which is part of the 
history of responsibility findings).7 
In some ways, this is a (boring) methodological debate. What I care 
about as responsibility is not what she cares about as responsibility. 
However, I take Lacey to be placing pressure on the philosophical ap-
proach in two ways. First, there is the implicit claim that it is altogether 
odd to claim to be looking at criminal law if one does not care about 
law. As she states, “Normative criminal law theory purports, after all, to 
have some grounding in the reality of criminal law: to offer an account 
of the implicit normative structure of an actually existing social prac-
tice.”8 And, second, there is the concern that one cannot make important 
contributions to the real world if one’s work is not grounded in the real 
world.9 
 
Lacey, Psychologising] (“My argument is that the institutional mechanisms needed to render 
subjective responsibility an object of proof in a criminal trial were not yet in place in the 
eighteenth Century . . . .”); Nicola Lacey, The Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the 
Context of Criminalization, in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 151, 154 (R.A. 
Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) [hereinafter Lacey, Resurgence] (critiquing criminal law 
theory “which locates its interpretation of criminal responsibility primarily within a concep-
tual analysis of legal doctrine in isolation from its context”). 
6 Lacey, supra note 1, at 926. 
7 For Lacey on plea-bargaining, see Lacey, Resurgence, supra note 5, at 175. For Lacey on 
insanity in the 1800s, see generally Lacey, Psychologising, supra note 5, at 111 (arguing that 
“mental derangement defences in late nineteenth Century England” demonstrated the im-
portance of character evaluation in criminal trials). 
8 Lacey, Resurgence, supra note 5, at 176. After noting that criminal law theorists write 
about a “small proportion of criminal law,” she states that, 
This self-imposed limitation enables many of them to retain an attachment to the 
idea . . . of a unitary theory of criminal law—an aesthetically pleasing idea, but one 
which is seriously at odds with the legal and social reality of both the substance and 
the source of criminal law—the supposed object of analysis. 
Id. at 175. 
9 See Lacey, Psychologising, supra note 5, at 131 (noting the need to understand the influ-
ence of character to fight against its resurgence); Lacey, Resurgence, supra note 5, at 156 
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I want to spend the vast majority of this Commentary placing our two 
different approaches into perspective, but before so doing, I want to de-
ny Lacey’s implicit claims that the philosophical approach to criminal 
law theory is too ivory tower. Unlike general jurisprudence, wherein the 
debates might be seen as utterly disconnected from the actual practice of 
law,10 criminal law theorists consistently engage with legal practice, 
whether taking issue with the relevance of neuroscience,11 offering prin-
ciples to limit overcriminalization,12 arguing against preventive and pre-
paratory offenses,13 or articulating a conception of consent for more just 
standards for sexual assault.14 Lacey rightly worries about the rise of 
“enemy criminal law,” the view of some people as “not us,” and she 
takes this approach to be a resurgence in the interest in character-based 
responsibility instead of in capacity-based responsibility (a focus on who 
someone is rather than the contours of her choice).15 But Lacey is not a 
voice in the wilderness here. Criminal law theorists are part of this dis-
cussion, including those whom she singles out as being too occupied 
with criminal law’s moral foundations.16 Criminal law theorists care 
 
(arguing that “the dynamics which shape the practice of criminal law and criminal justice, 
and the socially received meaning of criminal conviction, are no respecters of philosophical 
integrity”). 
10 See Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law (2015) (arguing against the general jurispru-
dence approach that searches for necessary and sufficient conditions because, although coer-
cion is not necessary for law, sociologically coercion is very much a part of law). Lacey 
seems to think both groups are guilty of the same vice. Lacey, supra note 1, at 936 (“As in 
jurisprudence, so in criminal law theory . . . .”). She takes criminal law theorists to focus 
“primarily on ideas.” Id. For my part, I think she reads too much jurisprudence into the 
methodology of criminal law theorists, and I worry that it is only because she reads criminal 
law theory through the prism of general jurisprudence’s methodological claims that she 
views criminal theory to be askew. (This isn’t to say that theorists are never guilty of un-
grounded analysis, simply that I fail to see the evidence that it is pervasive.) 
11 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 
13 Law and Neuroscience 529 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). 
12 See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (2008). 
13 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen J. Morse, Crime 
and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law 199 (2009). 
14 See, e.g., Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 333, 333 (2004). 
15 “Preventive in temper; disproportionate in reaction; indifferent to normal procedural 
protections, ‘enemy criminal law’ is essentially a police power which treats its objects as 
dangers to be managed, as distinct from citizen criminal law, which responds to subjects in-
vested with rights.” Lacey, Resurgence, supra note 5, at 168. 
16 Lacey mentions Duff, Gardner, Tadros, and the contributions to a volume on criminal 
law’s philosophical foundations. Lacey, supra note 1, at 937 n.48 and accompanying text. 
These theorists are very much a part of the discussion about the overreaching of the current 
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about law, and specifically the extent to which the law can, does, and 
should embody our best moral theories. Ultimately, Lacey does not seem 
to have made the case for methodological superiority. 
However, rather than just rejecting Lacey’s methodological critique, I 
thought I would take up her challenge. I decided to read historical ac-
counts of responsibility practices and see whether I found that our un-
derstanding of responsibility is deeper and more nuanced for having un-
dertaken such an inquiry. I thought I would read histories that 
challenged most what I take to be required for criminal responsibility. 
I started with The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of 
Animals.17 In a fabulously interesting exploration, E.P. Evans first pro-
vides a historical analysis, and then, in the second part of his book, he 
compares animals’ trials with the “modern” concerns of Evans’s day (so 
modern is 1906). 
In part I, Evans introduces us to a world as bizarre as it is familiar. 
Rats were represented by counsel, and indeed, their attorney not only 
claimed that they needed proper service of process but also sought to ex-
cuse their absence on the grounds that the journey was long and included 
the peril of facing cats along the way.18 Notice mattered. In 1487 in Au-
tun, public announcements were made for three days in every parish en-
treating slugs to exit the territory.19 And consider the defendants below, 
who were entitled to due process of law: 
 Quite recently in China fifteen wooden idols were tried and con-
demned to decapitation for having caused the death of a man of high 
military rank. On complaint of the family of the deceased . . . the cul-
prits . . . [were] brought before the criminal court . . . , which after due 
process of law sentenced them to have their heads severed from their 
bodies and then to be thrown into a pond.20 
 
criminal law. See, e.g., John Gardner, Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective, in Offences 
and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law 213, 236–37 (2007) (dis-
cussing the “major legitimization crisis” in criminal law which he attributes to the “ideology 
of consumerism”); Victor Tadros, Justice and Terrorism, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 658, 664 
(2007) (analyzing the United Kingdom’s terrorism laws); R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and 
the Presumption of Innocence 14 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2103303) (analyzing whether the practice of pretrial detention is compatible with 
the presumption of innocence).  
17 E.P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals (1906). 
18 Id. at 18–19. 
19 Id. at 36–37. 
20 Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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One has to wonder what bizarre beliefs individuals held as one reads 
Evans’s details of the use of animals as witnesses,21 the possibility of 
pigs being on the hook as accomplices to the principal perpetrator (also a 
pig),22 the torture of animals by the French to get confessions,23 the pros-
ecution of corpses by the Chinese,24 and the “punishment” of trees by 
deodand, as set forth by none other than Blackstone.25 
Of course, these beliefs were inextricably intertwined with religion. 
The prosecution of many animals was through the Church.26 There was 
concern that one could not distinguish between locusts that were the 
embodiment of the devil and those that were sent by an angry deity.27 
Nevertheless, the defense attorneys did not offer a “the devil made me 
do it” defense, but instead opted for something far closer to the “um, it’s 
a bug” defense. Excusing conditions obtained. One fascinating case was 
the treatment of weevils in the 1580s. The weevils were eating crops. 
“[T]wo points are presented with great clearness and seem to be accept-
ed as uncontestable: first, the right of the insects to adequate means of 
subsistence suited to their nature.”28 Accordingly, experts were sent to 
find a tract of land upon which the weevils could munch.29 Second, “no 
one appears to have doubted for a moment that the Church could, by vir-
tue of its anathema, compel these creatures to stop their ravages and 
cause them to go from one place to another.”30 The weevils could not 
help but eat, but they would need to eat on designated land. 
Still, rationality excuses were viewed with skepticism. In another 
case, the locusts’ defense attorney argued that “a procedure implies that 
the parties summoned are endowed with reason and volition and are 
therefore capable of committing crime,” but with locusts the defender 
implored, “[T]he rational faculties essential to the capability of commit-
ting criminal actions are wanting.”31 The defense attorney’s “scepticism 
does not seem to have been taken seriously, but was evidently smiled at 
 
21 Id. at 11. 
22 Id. at 144. 
23 Id. at 139. 
24 Id. at 110. 
25 Id. at 186. 
26 Id. at 3. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 Id. at 50. 
29 Id. at 48. 
30 Id. at 50. 
31 Id. at 98–99. 
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as the trick of a pettifogger bound to use every artifice to clear his cli-
ents.”32 
In the second part of the book, we see that the same puzzles that dog 
criminal law theorists today troubled them then. Evans observes that, 
“From the standpoint of ancient and mediaeval jurisprudents the overt 
act alone was assumed to constitute the crime; the mental condition of 
the criminal was never or at least very seldom taken into considera-
tion.”33 Evans celebrates his modern criminal law, which “looks primari-
ly to the psychical origin of the deed, and only secondarily to its physi-
cal effects.”34 “Where [normal freedom of will] is wanting, there is no 
culpability, whatever may have been the consequences of the act.”35 
Still: 
 A point of practical importance, which the criminal anthropologist 
has to consider is the relation of moral to penal responsibility. If there 
is no freedom of the will and the commission of crime is the necessary 
result of physiological idiosyncrasies . . . over which the individual 
has no control and by which his destiny is determined, then he is cer-
tainly not morally responsible for his conduct. But is he on this ac-
count to be exempt from punishment? The vast majority of criminal-
ists answer this question unhesitatingly in the negative, declaring that 
penal legislation is independent of metaphysical opinion, and that pun-
ishment is proper and imperative so far as it is essential to the protec-
tion and preservation of society.36 
Evans bemoans that “future generations will condemn as equally absurd 
and outrageous our judicial treatment of human beings, who can no 
more help perpetrating deeds of violence, under given conditions, than 
 
32 Id. at 108. 
33 Id. at 200. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 210–11. Evans seems to embrace not only determinism but also incompatibilism: 
Criminal propensities . . . are the resultants of race, temperament . . . and other pre-
natal and post-natal influences and agencies, to which the individual did not voluntari-
ly subject himself and from which he cannot escape. The acts, therefore, which he per-
forms, whether good or evil, are as independent of his will as the colour of his hair or 
the shape of his nose; for while they are apparently volitional impulses, the will itself, 
from which they seem to proceed, is determined by forces as fixed and free from his 
control as are those which rendered him blue-eyed or snub-nosed. 
Id. at 214–15. 
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locusts and caterpillars.”37 Here, Evans rages against the death penalty 
for a nonculpable actor: 
[An animal] was put to death not because it was culpable, but because 
it was harmful; and this is the ground on which the radical wing of 
criminal anthropologists would repress and eliminate a vicious person 
without regard to his mental soundness or moral responsibility; . . . he 
is a microbe injurious to the social organism and must be destroyed.38 
Before charting out the lessons we might extract from Evans, let me 
turn to my other historical venture. I probed another point in our crimi-
nal law’s history—the Salem witchcraft trials. I have been fascinated by 
these trials since college. How could anyone really be prosecuted for be-
ing a witch? 
So, again, I read a book. And, I should mention my first concern. Alt-
hough Lacey begins with a confession to historians that she deploys 
their work for sociological study,39 Lacey essentially advocates that we 
all take history more seriously. My confession is that I am not quite sure 
how she wants me to do this. As Lacey notes, there has been increasing 
specialization and sophistication in the relevant disciplines. What that 
means is that there is quite a bit of work to do to be good at any of them. 
I spend my life reading philosophy. But to take Lacey seriously, was I 
supposed to read all the books on the Salem witchcraft trials? Is it 
enough to get a flavor, or must I go to the original sources? After all, 
reading criminal law theory concepts into history requires not only his-
torical expertise but also a strong handle on criminal law theory. Ac-
cordingly, ought I to rely on a historian’s description of what mattered at 
a given moment? 
Still, A Storm of Witchcraft has great reviews and so off I read.40 The 
first thing to note is that people really believed in witches.41 Even the 
“heroes” of this historical travesty believed in witches. I have not be-
lieved in witches since I was about four. That fear was the fault of Dis-
ney, not the devil. 
 
37 Id. at 222. 
38 Id. at 222–23. 
39 Lacey, supra note 1, at 921. 
40 Emerson W. Baker, A Storm of Witchcraft: The Salem Trials and the American Experi-
ence (2015). 
41 Id. at 285. 
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Emerson Baker helpfully details the fragile moment in Salem’s histo-
ry. The citizens were stressed. A once powerful colony was facing eco-
nomic troubles, was losing political power vis-à-vis England,42 and was 
home to many colonists who had survived frightful battles against the 
French and Native Americans.43 The town had terrible factions, and the 
minister in Salem Village ultimately substantially exacerbated tensions 
amongst the townspeople.44 Although Baker makes room for “a consid-
erable amount of deliberate fraud,”45 he also seems sympathetic to post-
traumatic stress disorder, sleep paralysis, and even mass hysteria, point-
ing to other outbreaks, including an analogous case of the disorder that 
arose in Le Roy, New York in 2011–12.46 He rejects convulsive ergot-
ism, encephalitis, and Lyme disease as none of these medical accounts 
fit the data.47 
The story exceeds what we might think. Although witches typically 
“tended to be poor and marginalized women,”48 women of high reli-
gious, economic, and political standing; men; and even Puritan ministers 
fell within the scope of those accused, convicted, and executed.49 These 
were not women with carrots tied to their noses.50 
Animals in France got better treatment than American witches. Crim-
inal defendants did not have defense attorneys.51 They were questioned 
by judges, not prosecutors.52 Of the twenty-eight people tried, all twen-
ty-eight were found guilty—“a prosecutorial success rate unparalleled in 
American history before or since.”53 
The primary debate was truly about scientific evidence. The “touch 
test” was performed wherein if the afflicted person was touched by the 
offending witch, the suffering was thought to immediately stop.54 And, 
individuals were convicted based on spectral evidence; that is, seeing the 
 
42 Id. at 56, 66–67. 
43 Id. at 63. 
44 Id. at 96–97. 
45 Id. at 113–14.  
46 Id. at 99–104, 108. 
47 Id. at 109–10.  
48 Id. at 20. 
49 Id. at 23, 32, 35, 37. 
50 As famously portrayed in Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python (Monty) Pictures 
1975). 
51 Baker, supra note 40, at 26. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 186. 
54 Id. at 27. 
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specter of the witches.55 But if Satan could create a specter of an inno-
cent person, how reliable was such evidence?56 Though such evidence 
would now be too unreliable for Daubert,57 it was routinely admitted, 
despite the possibility of satanic falsification. Indeed, Baker notes that 
the experiments carried about by the judges “seem laughably simple on 
the surface, but in carrying them out the judges drew upon some of the 
latest scientific advances and were supported by some of the leading 
English religious, legal, and philosophical minds of the day.”58 None 
other than Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale had employed the touch test 
to convict witches.59 
What would Lacey say? I suspect that she would see criminal respon-
sibility not as a question of complicated mens rea and doctrine, but as a 
robust assessment of character, containment, and “enemy criminal law.” 
The punishment of locusts and the admission of the nature of the weevil 
are to Lacey, I would suppose, the embodiment of a criminal law that 
cares about the character or nature of the criminal subject and that takes 
quelling the masses as the criminal law’s object. The Salem witchcraft 
trials likewise display the use of power and the fact that fine analytical 
distinctions in law make little difference if verdicts are determined by 
the touch test and spectral evidence. The townspeople simply lacked the 
tools to get to the truth. 
That is not what I see. In Salem, I see the evidentiary errors, the pro-
cedural improprieties, and the turbulent times at the root of this histori-
cal moment. These trials were part of an institutional crisis—
considerable unrest and a perfect storm of factors led citizens to accuse 
and judges to convict. And so I learned what that criminal process was 
for. The citizens were scared, and these prosecutions made them sleep 
better at night. But I have not learned anything about criminal responsi-
bility. The only thing to say about that is that innocent people died. 
Reading Evans, the struggles he articulates—to understand free will 




57 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
58 Id. at 117.  
59 Id. at 118. 
60 Evans, supra note 17, at 226 (“One of the chief difficulties encountered by those who 
seek to frame and administer penal laws on psycho-pathological principles arises from the 
fact that no one has ever yet been able to give an exact and adequate definition of insanity.”). 
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choice or character,61 and to determine the role of retribution versus pre-
vention62—are as pressing today. I do not see a difference; I see the 
same quest for understanding about when the state can justly punish. I 
do not see the caterpillars as having criminal responsibility. I see that 
our best moral theories about what is required for responsibility, ration-
ality, and volitional capacities yield the conclusion that the criminal jus-
tice system was being used for misguided ends. What criminal punish-
ment did was to function as a form of social control, quelling the masses 
by excommunicating insects. But these facts simply have no bearing on 
what moral responsibility is or whether at root the criminal law ought to 
punish only those who deserve it. 
And so we have two histories. As Lacey says, “each approach has im-
portant insights to deliver.”63 Ultimately, Lacey and I likely condemn the 
same practices and see the same questions. But we offer two different 
histories of criminal responsibility. Lacey’s history tells a rich and intri-
cate story of the shape of criminal responsibility in times of unrest and 
superstition. My history sees responsibility as the fixed star—the con-
stant over space and time—that shines light on the truth of when indi-
viduals ought to be punished, and casts shadows when our practices 
have led us astray. 
 
 
61 Id. at 241–43 (describing killings by a nurse who was kind and compassionate during 
her fifteen years of incarceration, thus prompting Evans to ask whether she ought to be pun-
ished when her killings were inconsistent with her character). 
62 Id. at 237 (noting that retribution and prevention are “closely intermixed” and “it is im-
possible to separate them”). 
63 Lacey, supra note 1, at 23. 
